<u>Annexure-I</u> <u>Comments on CERC Staff Paper on Power Market Pricing:</u>

Sno.	Clause	Comment
1	2.2 However, due to a uniform price for all type of market participants who are cleared, all sellers who bid lower prices get an extra profit (difference of the UMCP and the bid price), which constitutes the seller's surplus. Owing to the recent events in the electricity market with prices reaching alarming levels, concerns have been raised that some sellers are making huge gains in the market due to this market auction design. This has prompted the regulators and policy makers to analyze different possible pricing methodologies	 1. As the staff paper itself says that Uniform Pricing method is used worldwide for price discovery in power exchange, it is a successful price discovery mechanism which perfectly evens out demand and supply, giving right incentive to seller and best price to the buyer. 2. this method is also in use in India for past 14 years and has been quite successful 3. PX prices have always remain stable except for few occasions for few days, when price rise was not due to Pricing methodologies but due to shortage of coal all over the country. Pertinent to note that during these times, OTC prices also rose exorbitantly. 4. During past 10 years the monthly IEX Prices have remain low most of the time. 82% of time prices have remain lower than Rs. 4/kWh. However there were only 3 instances in last 10 years when monthly average IEX prices have been very high i.e. more than Rs. 7/kWh (See Annexure-1 for detailed analysis of IEX Prices)
2	2.3.3. Pay as Bid — Prices paid to the cleared sellers are based on the sell bid offered by the respective seller. Thus, each seller is paid a different price tied to the bid offered by them and these prices are not dependent on the price of the most expensive seller cleared to meet demand.	Apart from the disadvantages of such approach listed down in the staff paper itself (Table 2.3.5 Clause) there will be following disadvantages also: 1. This will discourage power suppliers to participate in PX as there will be no premium for them. 2. Many a times thermal power generator put minimum price bid (10 p/kWh) due to issues like technical minimum schedule etc. In such a case if they are paid @ bid price, it will be huge loss to them. 3. Alternately they will not quote such low tariffs but will quote a tariff higher than their variable cost, in such a case MCP will be higher, thus buyer will end up paying more. Hence such pricing method shall be a hara-kiri for power markets.

On the contrary, it will increase the power prices as it will compel sellers to quote higher prices that will raise the reference point for MCP hence MCP will raise the reference point for MCP hence MCP will raise the reference point for MCP hence MCP will raise the reference point for MCP hence MCP will rise which will result in buyers paying higher prices thus costlier power to the consumers. Since such an approach will discourage Power suppliers to participate in PX as the incentive to bid in PX is lost, less supplier will bid in PX and will prefer to sell their power through other methods like OTC and DSM, hence this approach will rather be detrimental for Market competition. Solution Since such an approach will discourage Power suppliers to participate in PX as the incentive to bid in PX is lost, less supplier will bid in PX and will prefer to sell their power through other methods like OTC and DSM, hence this approach will rather be detrimental for Market competition. Please note that Long term measures proposed by ACER insists on correcting demand side like better Demand side management, shifting to renewables at a large process that will compel sellers to quote higher prices that will raise the reference point for MCP hence MCP will rise which will result in buyers paying higher prices thus costlier power to the consumers.
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correcting pricing methodology of power markets.
<u>6</u> 2.5.3.3. On 1st April 2022, the It may be appreciated that despite of curbing DAM
Commission directed the power and RTM market to Rs. 12/kWh, the power prices
exchanges until further orders, to re- in Short Term Market and TAM Market were way
design, with immediate effect, the above the threshold of Rs. 12/kWh. The volumes
bidding software in such a way that sold in TAM and OTC market also rose exorbitantly
members can submit their bids in the in April & May 2022, which further led CERC to cap
price range of Rs.0/kWh to Rs.12/kWh the OTC market also at Rs. 12/kWh
for DAM and RTM
7 3.2.1 Market power is what should be A better way to prevent misuse of market position
a matter of concern. That is, as a matter by the suppliers is to cap the maximum bid price,
of principle, is intervention in the which CERC has done a few times in the past. Since
market is justified when the price spike the market abnormality is temporary in nature, it
is a result of market power or misuse of seprendent that only temporary solution shall be
market position by supplie <u>rs</u> provided so that the basis of market design is not
disturbed. Further already successful criterion for
price discovery should not be tampered with.